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THE 1981 MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: THE IMPACT ON
CENTRAL PANEL STATES
DUANE
I.

R.

HARVES·

INTRODUCTION

In order to ensure public participation and uniformity in ad
ministrative proceedings, federal and state governments have
adopted administrative procedure acts. Since the adoption of the
1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, state admin
istrative law has grown enormously in size and complexity. This fact
was noted and discussed by the Commissioners in their prefatory
note when adopting the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure
Act (MSAPA).
During those twenty years, legislatures have been delegating
more substantive authority to state agencies in areas of law such as
energy and the environment which were not even being discussed in
1961. These same areas of law have led to an increase in litigation
following state agency action. Thus, the necessity of establishing a
uniform act containing procedures to safeguard public participation
yet maintaining agency flexibility and which will survive legal chal
lenge almost speaks for itself. While the 1981 Act has provided some
excellent suggestions for states to utilize, the central question is
whether it has gone far enough in its attempt to ensure truly fair
adjudicative hearings where individual rights, duties or privileges
are granted, denied or restricted.
Eight states have addressed this issue by creating an independ
ent office to conduct administrative hearings. The independence of
the persons conducting administrative hearings is necessary to en
sure not only actual impartiality, but the appearance of impartiality.
If government is judged by the methods by which it performs its
tasks, the appearance of an evil is just as destructive as the evil itself.
• Chief Administrative Law Judge, Minnesota Officc of Administrative Hearings.
B.A., Mankato State University, 1963; J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 1967.
Faculty, National Judicial College; adjunct faculty, William Mitchell College of Law.
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Therefore, an effective administrative procedure act, which is ex
tremely important to all governments, should contain provisions for
an independent agency of administrative hearing personnel, be they
called administrative law judges, hearing examiners or hearing
officers.
The 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act I provides
for the creation of an Office of Administrative Hearings as a separate
agency to conduct adjudicative hearings. 2 The provisions, however,
are deficient in two respects. First, while proclaiming its indepen
dence, it is proposed for inclusion within an existing executive
branch agency.3 Second, state agencies would not be compelled to
use the office,4 which could also have an adverse impact on eight
states which have created a central panel of administrative law
judges or hearing examiners to conduct administrative hearings.s
This article will discuss these deficiencies and their impact on the
central panel systems, with emphasis on the Minnesota system which
was established in 1975.6

II.

INDEPENDENCE

The MSAPA, in Article IV, Chapter III, proposes that the Office
of Administrative Hearings (OAH) be located within another agency
of state government. In the comments accompanying the MSAPA, it
is stated: "The intent is to place the office in the most neutral possi
1. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Uniform Law Commission
ers 1981) (approved and recommended for enactment in all the states at the N aliona!
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Annual Conference in New Orle
ans. Louisiana. July 3 I-August 7. 1981) [hereinafter cited as MSAPA).
2. ftJ. § 4-301.
3. Id. § 4-301(a) provides: "There is created the office of administrative hearings
within the [Department of
• to be headed by a director appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the senate)." Id
4. Id. § 4-202(a) provides:
The agency head. one or more members of the agency head. one or more ad
ministrative law judges assigned by the office of administrative hearings in ac
cordance with Section 4-301 [.or. unless prohibited by law. one or more other
persons designated by the agency head). in the discretion of the agency head.
may be the presiding officer.
Id
5. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11370 (Deering 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001(1)
(1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65 (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7. § 4H (Michie/
Law Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-I (West Supp. 1983-1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321 (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010 (Supp. 1983-1984); and 1975 MINN. LAWS ch.
380. § 60.
6. 1975 MINN. LAWS ch. 380. § 60.

1984)

CENTRAL PANEL STATES

663

ble organizational position, so as to maximize the independence of
the office."7 Can the OAH be truly independent if it is reliant on a
larger agency for its budget, housing and other needs? A look at the
systems in the eight central panel states may be helpful.
First, where do we find provisions similar to MSAPA? Califor
nia's Office of Administrative Hearings, headed by a director,S is lo
cated within the Department of General Services. 9 The director is
appointed by the Governor subject to confirmation by the California
Senate. to In Colorado, the Division of Hearing Officers is located
within the Department of Administration, headed by a director with
civil service status, 11 who also serves as the executive director of the
Department of Administration. 12 In Massachusetts, the Division of
Hearing Officers is located within the executive offices for Adminis
tration and Finance. 13 Its chief hearing officer is appointed by the
secretary ofthe executive office, with the approval of the Governor. 14
Tennessee's Administrative Procedures Division, headed by a direc
tor who is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Secretary of
State, is located within the Office of the Secretary of State. IS
Examining the other central panel states, Minnesota's Office of
Administrative Hearings is a separate agency of state government, 16
7. MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301 comment at 71-72.
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § I I 370.2(a). "There is in the Department of General Serv
ices the Office of Administrative Hearings which is under the direction and control of an
executive officer who shall be known as the director." Id
9. Id
10. CAL. GOv'T CODE § I I 370.2(b).
II. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 38 (1983).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001(1). "There is hereby created the division of
hearing officers in the department of administration, the head of which shall be the exec
utive director of the department of administration." Id
13. MASS. ANN. LAW, ch. 7, § 4H. "There shall be within the executive office for
Administration and Finance a division of hearing officers under the direction of a chief
hearings officer who shall be appointed by the secretary of the executive office for Ad
ministration and Finance with the approval of the governor." Id
14. Id
15. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note II, at 37-39; TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-321.
"[T)here is created in the office of the secretary of state a division to be known as the
administrative procedures division." Id
16. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48.
A state office of administrative hearings is created. The office shall be under the
direction of a chief administrative law judge, who shall be learned in the law
and appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the senate, for a
term ending on June 30 of the sixth calendar year after appointment. . . .
[T)he chief administrative law judge shall be in the unclassified service, but may
be removed from his position only for cause.
Id
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as is the Washington Office of Administrative Hearings'" In New
Jersey, the Office of Administrative Law is independent, but, be
cause of constitutional requirements, is located within the Depart
ment of State. 18 Florida's Division of Administrative Hearings,
while located.within the Department of Administration, which must
provide administrative support and services, is specifically not sub
ject to control, supervision, or direction of the Department of
Administration. 19
In Minnesota, the chief administrative law judge is appointed
by the governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate, for a six-year
term. 20 Washington's chief administrative law judge is appointed by
the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of
five years. 21 In New Jersey, the director is appointed by the gover
nor with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of six
years. 22 Florida's director is appointed by a majority vote of the Ad
ministration Commission but serves at the· discretion of that
17. WASH. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010.
A state office of administrative hearings is hereby created. The office shall be
independent of state administrative agencies and shall be responsible for impar
tial administration of administrative bearings in accordance with the legislative
intent expressed by this chapter. . . . The office shall be under the direction of
a chief administrative law judge, appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the senate, for a term of five years.
Id
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-1.
There is hereby established in the Executive Branch of the State Government
the Office of Administrative Law. For the purpose of complying with the provi
sions of Article V, Section IV, paragraph I of the New Jersey Constitution, the
Office of Administrative Law is hereby allocated within the Department of
State, but notwithstanding said alloCation, the office shall be independent of
any supervision or control by the department or by any personnel thereof.
Id
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(1).
There is hereby created the Division of Administrative Hearings within the De
partment of Administration, to be headed by a director who shall be appointed
by the Administrative Commission and confirmed by the Senate. . . . The De
partment of Administration shall provide administrative support and service to
the division. The division shall not be subject to control, supervision, or direc
tion by the Department of Administration.
Id
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48. It should also be noted that the chief hearing ex
aminer is the only department head in Minnesota who does not serve a term coterminus
with the governor and at the pleasure of the governor. Id § 15.06(2).
21. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.010.
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-3. ''The head of the office shall be the director who
shall be an attorney-at-law of this State. The director shall be appointed by the Gover
nor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The director shall serve for a term of 6
years." Id
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commission. 23
From the foregoing, it can be seen that four of the existing cen
tral panel states have adopted language similar to that found in the
MSAPA,24 while the other four opted for actual and near total inde
pendence. 25 Only where the central panel is a totally separate and
independent agency is true independence achieved. While Florida's
director serves at the discretion of the Administrative Commission;
in fact, the director has never been threatened with removal nor his
independence challenged. 26 The addition of a fixed term of office
together with a removal only for cause, however, as recommended in
the MSAPA,27 would certainly be the better approach. For that the
drafters of the MSAPA are to be commended.
But why stop short? The drafters missed a golden opportunity
to provide for independence. We are unable to discern from the
comments to the MSAPA why it was decided to place the OAH
within another agency of government as the drafters are silent on
that issue. One can only surmise that recommending the creation of
the OAH was such a "hot" issue with the commissioners that com
promises had to be made and total independence of the OAH was
sacrificed in the process.
Based on the experience of the central panel states to date, the
data treating the OAH as a totally separate agency is the more
favorable approach. While none of the semi-independent OAH's
have complained of interference with decisional independence, lack
ing total control over personnel and, more significantly, lacking full
control of the budget has had an impact on these operations. 28
Therefore, it is recommended that when considering the creation of
an OAH, states should legislate independence to their OAH rather
than creating a "division" within an existing agency.
III.

MANDATORY USE OF THE OAH

While the comments to the MSAPA indicate that "the question
23. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note II, at 38-39. The Florida Administration
Commission consists of the governor and his cabinet of six. Id. See also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 120.65(1).
24. California, Colorado, Massachusetts and Tennessee. See supra notes 8·15 and
accompanying text.
25. Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington. See supra notes 16-19 and
accompanying text.
26. Interview with Director Chris H. Bentley.
27. MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301.
28. Conversations with directors of central panel systems in California, Colorado,
Florida, New Jersey and Washington.

666

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:661

whether the use of administrative law judges from the OAH is per
missive or mandatory depends on whether or not a state adopts cer
tain language that is bracketed in [s]ection 4-202(a)."29 A reading of
the bracketed language, however, does not necessarily mandate this
outcome in every case. The bracketed language referred to is: "or
unless prohibited by law, one or more other persons designated by
the agency head."30 Even if one were to follow the suggestions in the
commentary, an "agency head, [or] one or more members of the
agency head"31 could still conduct a hearing, totally at their discre
tion. This leaves to the agency the decision to keep or refer cases
without any standards or criteria to guide it. Thus, an agency could
choose to keep those cases of political importance to itself. This
could deprive a respondent, in a sanctions case for instance, from a
truly fair hearing before a totally impartial presiding officer.
How have the existing central states responded to this issue? As
was probably the case during the commissioners' deliberations, there
is a split among the states.
Colorado, Florida and Washington statutes have language simi
lar to the MSAPA.32 In Colorado, the agency head may conduct the
hearing and, if authorized by law, a hearing officer from the agency
may conduct the hearing. 33 Conversely, it can be deduced that if an
agency is not specifically authorized by law to have its own hearing
officers conduct the hearings, it must use a hearing officer from the
Division of Hearing Officers if the agency head does not personally
preside. Florida's APA most closely tracks the MSAPA language by
requiring the use of a hearing officer from the Division of Adminis
trative Hearings unless the hearing is conducted by an agency head
or a member of an agency.34 Washington's act, while not tracking
the MSAP A language verbatim, does allow the final decision to be
rendered by an agency official even though that person may preside
over the hearing. 35 Thus, Colorado would benefit from adoption of
29.

MSAPA, supra note I, § 4-301 comment, at 71.

30.

fd. § 4.202(8).
fd.

31.
32. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
33. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-105(3). "At a hearing only one of the following may
preside: the agency or if otherwise authorized by law, a hearing officer who if authorized
by law may be a member of the body which comprises the agency." fd.
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(IXa). "A hearing officer assigned by the division
shall conduct all hearings under this subsection, except for: 1. Hearings before agency
heads or a member thereof other than an agency head . . . ." Id
35. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.12.040. "Whenever a state agency conducts a
hearing which is not presided over by officials of the agency who are to render the final
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the MSAPA language but there would be no apparent impact in
Florida or Washington.
None of the existing central panels have jurisdiction to conduct
100% of the administrative hearings in their states due to exemptions
created by the legislatures in those states. However, the remaining
five states have either mandatory language for all hearings or a com
bination of mandatory and permissive. It is in these states where
adoption of the MSAPA language could have a negative impact by
allowing agencies to "pick and choose."
The preferred language should read: "All hearings of state
agencies required to be conducted under this chapter shall be con
ducted by (hearing officers, hearing examiners or administrative law
judges) from the Office of Administrative Hearings." This language,
or very similar language, can be found in California,36 Minnesota37
and New Jersey.38 Massachusetts requires use of a division hearing
officer in certain cases and allows their use in other instances. 39 In
Tennessee, some agencies are specifically authorized to use an ad
ministrative judge or hearing officer from the agency to preside over
a contested case,40 alone or in conjunction with an agency head. 41
decision, the hearing shall be conducted by an administrative law judge assigned under
this chapter." Id
36. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11502. "All hearings of state agencies required to be con
ducted under this chapter shall be conducted by hearing officers on the staff of the Office
of Administrative Hearings." Id
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.50. "All hearings of state agencies required to be con
ducted under this chapter shall be conducted by a hearing examiner assigned by the chief
hearing examiner." Id
38. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5n. "Assign an administrative law judge to any
agency empowered to conduct contested cases to preside over such proceedings in con
tested cases as are required by . . . (C.52:14B-9 and 52:14B-IO)." Id
39. MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 7, § 4H.
[The chief hearings officer) shall hear, or assign for hearing, appeals filed pursu
ant to section thirty-six of chapter six A and shall make available not less than
three full-time hearings officers or the equivalent thereof, to hear appeals as
signed pursuant to sections forty-two and forty-three of chapter thirty-one. . . .
Any officer or agency oCthe commonwealth authorized to conduct adjudicatory
proceedings or to hear appeals from such proceedings may, subject to the ap
proval of the secretary of the executive office within which such officer is em
ployed or such agency is located, request the division to conduct one or more
classes of such proceedings or appeals on behalf of the officer or agency. . . .
Id
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-102:
(I) "Administrative judge" means an agency member, agency employee, or
employee of the administrative procedures division of the office of the secretary
of state, licensed to practice law, and authorized by law to conduct contested
case proceedings pursuant to § 4-5-301.
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Where agencies are not authorized to have staff administrative
judges or hearing officers, use of the Division of Administrative Pro
cedures staff is mandatory.42
As the foregoing illustrates, the majority of the central panel
states utilize the mandatory language. What is most bothersome is
how easy it would be to amend the proposed MSAPA language to
allow deputy or assistant department heads to serve as presiding of
ficers. If that were to occur in Minnesota, it could be assured that
only the occupational licensing boards, the Public Utilities Commis
sion and the Pollution Control Board would continue to have their
hearings conducted by the OAH, along with the workers' compensa
tion cases which are not within the Minnesota APA. The identical
situation would occur in New Jersey and Washington43 and could
(4) "Hearing officer" means an agency member or employee, not licensed to
practice law, and authorized by law to conduct a contested case proceeding
pursuant to § 4-5-301.
Id

41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-301:
(a) In the hearing of any contested case the proceedings or any part thereof:
(I) Shall be conducted in the presence of the requisite number of mem
bers of the agency as prescribed by law and in the presence of an adminis
trative judge or hearing officer; or
(2) Shall be conducted by an administrative judge or hearing officer sit
ting alone.
(b)

(c) The agency shall determine whether the contested case shall be conducted
by an administrative judge or hearing officer sitting alone or in the presence of
the members of the agency; . . . .
(d) Any agency authorized by law to have a contested case conducted by an
administrative judge, hearing officer or similar officer from the agency may di
rect that the proceedings or any part thereof be conducted by an administrative
judge or hearing officer which the agency shall provide from the members of
the agency or the agency's regular employees. Contested cases under this sub
section may be conducted by administrative judges from the administrative
procedures division of the office of the secretary of state upon the request of any
agency being presented to the secretary of state and the request being granted.
Id (Emphasis added).
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-301(e):
Any agency not authorized by law to have a contested case conducted by an
administrative judge, hearing officer or similar officer from the agency shall
direct that the proceedings or any part thereof be conducted by an administra
tive judge from the administrative procedures division of the office of the secre
tary of state.
43. During each legislative session over the past seven years, Minnesota state agen
cies have sought various exemptions from the Minnesota APA. Most notable was the
exemption obtained by the Department of Public Welfare in 1976 which allows the de
partment to use its own non-attorney referees to conduct hearings on appeals from
county determinations of benefit eligibility under federally funded programs. The de
partment has attempted, in each succeeding legislative session, to expand this exemption.
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reasonably be expected to occur in other central panel states.
Savings in both time and costs have been documented in both
Minnesota44 and New Jersey.4S These savings have occurred be
cause the hearings are conducted by persons properly trained in the
conduct of hearings who have no other responsibilities. Addition
ally, a central panel system allows grouping of different cases before
one judge thus saving time and costs when travel is necessary. Fi
nally, having all cases heard in a single agency allows a review of
those cases to determine whether hearings are really necessary in all
instances. In Minnesota, this has led directly to a reduction of re
quired hearings by thirty-five percent as a result of legislation pro
posed by the OAH and passed by the Legislature. 46 Allowing
agencies the right to hear their own cases thus defeats an important
reason for creating a central panel system--savings of both time and
costs.47
Therefore, care should be exercised when considering the adop
tion of the MSAPA so that what has been adopted in eight states will
not be eliminated or weakened, and so that a newly created central
panel will operate both efficiently and in a cost-effective manner.
In order to correct the deficiencies noted in this article, when
considering adoption of the MSAPA, the following amendments
should be made to insure mandatory use of the OAH.
§ 4-102(d): An adjudicative proceeding commences when the
a!eBey er a presidia! eftieer administrative law judge:
§ 4-202:
(a) The a!eBey head, eBe er mere members ef the ageftey
head; One or more administrative law judges assigned by the office
of administrative hearings in accordance with Section 4-301 ia the
diseretieB ef t1te ageftey head, may shall be the presiding officer.
The Minnesota Department of Public Safety continues to conduct its own driver evalua
tion hearings even though the hearings are not exempt from the Minnesota AP A.
In New Jersey, the office of administrative law has been involved in legal actions to
compel the Commissioner of Banks and the Secretary of Labor to submit their hearings
to the jurisdiction of the office. As in Minnesota, New Jersey agencies continue to try to
obtain exemptions through the legislature. In Minnesota, New Jersey and Washington,
state agencies were the leading opponents of the creation of the central panel in that
state. (Conversations with directors of the central panels in New Jersey and
Washington.)
44. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and Effective: How
tire AU Central Panel System Worlcs in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257 (1981).
45. Kestin, Riform of tire Administrative Process, 92 N.J. LAW. 35 (1980).
46. Compiled statistics for in-house budgetary planning, Office of Administrative
Hearings.
47. The fair hearing arguments, being obvious, are not discussed in this article.
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(e) If a substitute is required for a person who is disqualified
or becomes unavailable for any other reason, the substitute must be
appointed by!" the chiefadministrative law judge.
(I) the go.erftor, if the disqtutlified or ufta.ailable penoft is aft
eleeted oOieial, or
(2) the appomtmg authorit" if the disqualified or ufta. ailable
person is aft appomted offieial.

§ 4-204:
The presiding officer designated to conduct the hearing may de
termine, subject to the agen:ey's office of administrative hearings'
rules, whether a pre-hearing conference will be conducted. If the
conference is conducted:
(I) The presiding officer shall promptly notify the agency of the
determination that a pre-hearing conference will be conducted.
The agefte, shaH assigtt or request the oOiee of admiftistrati. e
hearings to assigft a presidiftg offieer for the pre heaMg e6ftfer
enee, exereismg the same discretion as is pro~ ided b, Seetioft ..
202 e6neemmg the seleetion of a presidiftg oOieer for a heariftg.

§4-215:
(a) If the presidiBg offieer is the agen:ey head, the presidiBg
offieer shaH ren:der a fiBal order.
--(H"bl-W)(a) If the presidiBg offieer ~ n:ot the agen:ey head, The pre
siding officer shall render an initial order, which becomes a final or
der unless reviewed in accordance with Section 4-216.
(e)(b) An fiBal order or initial order must...
(g)(f) An fiBal order or initial order pursuant. . .
(h1(g) The presiding officer shall cause copies of the fiBalor
der or initial order to be delivered to each party and to the agency
head.
§ 4-301:
(a) There is created the office of administrative hearings
within the [Department of
] to be headed by a direetor chief
administraiive law judge appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the senate. The chiefadministrative law judge shall servefor a term
of six years and may be removed only for just cause.
(b) All adjudicative hearings required to be conducted pursuant
to this act shall be conducted by an administrative law judgefrom the
oJIice of administrative hearings.
§ 4-503:
(a) The agen:ey head, on:e or more members of the agen:ey
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head, One or more administrative law judges assigned by the office
of administrative hearings in accordance with Section 4-301, itt the
diseretieft ef the ageftey head, may shall be the presiding officer.
Uttless prehibited by law, a perseft e",ereisittg atltherity eyer the
Blatter is tfie presidittg eftieer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The drafters of the 1981 MSAPA, while trying to create inde
pendence in adjudicative hearings, missed the opportunity to create
a truly independent agency, the use of which would be mandatory.
If adopted in the existing central panel states, the MSAPA would
have a negative impact on five of those states' independent agencies.
However, the MSAPA can, and should, be amended to correct the
deficiencies before adoption.

